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Since 1971, there have been more than 300 articles published in Computer on the topic of electronic privacy and about three times that number on cybersecurity, with many of these articles cov-
ering both topics. Roughly a third of all these articles 
appeared within the past five years, indicating that there 
is a lot of interest in security and privacy. These statis-
tics are also telling in that Computer competes for content 
with other IEEE Computer Society publications, particu-
larly IEEE Security and Privacy, which was first published 
in 2003. 
In their seminal article from 2004, Avižienis et al.1
treated security as one of the attributes of dependable 
systems, defining depend abi l it y as “the ability to 
deliver service that can justifiably be trusted.” They 
made no reference to privacy. Likewise, that same year, 
Voas2 mentioned security but not privacy as one of the 
many quality attributes of soft-
ware. Looking back at these arti-
cles, one might ask, for instance, 
“Why wouldn’t we want both secu-
rity and privacy, given our depen-
dence on the navigation apps on 
our smartphones and that we need 
to not only trust in the integrity 
of the data these apps use to compute travel routes but 
also in the protection of the privacy of our location data?
What are the tradeoffs among security, privacy, and 
other system attributes, such as testability?” In a sys-
tems context, it seems natural to think about the inter-
play between security and privacy requirements, poli-
cies, and mechanisms.
Given the seemingly ever-growing impact of secu-
rity and privacy on society, from electronic voting to 
computer-based contact tracing to automated driving, 
we thought the readers of Computer would benefit from 
a virtual roundtable in which a panel of experts provide 
its views on the relationship between security and privacy. 
To draw the attention of prospective panelists, we posed 
a highly charged teaser question. Is the relationship 
between the two terms best described as 1) security or pri-
vacy or 2) security and privacy; that is, can you have both? 
Our tactic had the intended effect. We received feedback 
on the title of the roundtable even before we made the 
questions available to the panelists. (See “Roundtable 
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Panelists” for more information about 
the panel.)
Let’s take a look at what the pan-
elists had to say. We hope you enjoy 
viewing their insightful perspectives.
COMPUTER: What role does cyberse-
curity play in protecting data privacy? 
Is it reasonable to ask for security 
and privacy, or should it be security 
or privacy? To what degree can you 
have both?
MATT BISHOP:  Whether it is rea-
sonable to ask for both security and 
privacy depends on your definitions 
of both “security” and “privacy.” Those 
definitions also underlie the degree 
to which you can have both. As secu-
rity is defined by a security policy and 
these policies differ wildly among 
institutions and people, I don’t believe 
there is a simple answer to these ques-
tions. It really depends on the security 
policy and your definition of “privacy.”
For e x a mple, let me be prec i se 
about what “data privacy” is. To my 
mind, it is the ability to control who 
sees the data and what they can do 
with the data. Under this definition, 
data privacy is really a variant of orig-
inator-controlled access control, with 
the “originator” being the subject of 
the data, who may not be the person 
generating or curating the data. Given 
this security policy, clearly it’s “and,” 
not “or.”
DOROTHY DENNING: I don’t accept 
the premise that security and privacy 
are in opposition. I don’t see how we 
can have data privacy without cyber-
sec u r it y. Sec u r it y is essent ia l for 
controlling access to data. Without 
it, someone can steal personal data 
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from your devices or the computers 
and networks used by companies and 
organizations that hold your data.
In fact, cybersecurity controls, 
such as encryption, support privacy 
so well that governments want back 
doors installed in them so that they 
can get access for law enforcement and 
national security reasons. But install-
ing back doors in security products 
weakens their security and, thus, their 
ability to provide privacy.
SIMSON GARFINKEL: Security is a 
necessary requirement for providing 
data privacy: without security, there 
is no way to prevent unauthorized 
access by hostile adversaries. But secu-
rity is not sufficient for privacy since 
security mechanisms can be used to 
enforce policies that do not provide 
privacy objectives.
WILLIAM STALLINGS:  There is an 
overlap in both objectives and technical 
controls. In both cases, you want to pro-
tect sensitive data from unauthorized 
disclosure or modification. Technolo-
gies, such as access control, authenti-
cation, federated identity, and so on, 
can be utilized to protect any kind of 
sensitive corporate data, including per-
sonally identifiable information (PII). 
But security controls are not enough to 
address privacy concerns, such as iden-
tifying uses and consumers of PII, seek-
ing agreement to employ PII, limiting 
its collection and application to iden-
tified purposes, and so forth. Controls 
that address these privacy concerns 
may not be practical for security. And 
then you have the problem that some 
controls, to enhance security, can vio-
late privacy, such as firewalls that have 
to do deep inspection of traffic. The 
tradeoff takes place at the corporate 
policy level, not the technical level.  
DAVID THAW: Security, of course, has 
a role to play in implementing data pri-
vacy goals. To say otherwise would be 
foolish. However, the long-standing 
framing of the tension between “secu-
rity” and “privacy” is counterproduc-
tive to discussions regarding data pri-
vacy in the digital age. Such framing is 
often rooted in debates regarding sur-
veillance, such as whether or not anti-
terrorism security efforts that monitor 
communications are run at odds with 
law-abiding citizens’ privacy interests 
in their conversations. In the purely 
surveillance analysis, this tension cer-
tainly exists. 
Surveillance, however, is not always 
the issue when security and privacy 
interact. I would argue the contrary. In 
most cases where security and privacy 
interact, surveillance is not the issue. 
Thus, while it is tempting to import 
the surveillance framing to other con-
texts, this can often be misleading. 
Privacy is a normative choice—val-
ues-based decisions we, as a society, 
make regarding policies, procedures, 
and goals respecting the degree to 
which citizens can enjoy limitations 
on intrusion or observation of certain 
aspects of their lives and property. 
Security, by contrast, is an objective 
exercise; security does not have an 
inherent stake in how small or large 
the sphere of privacy is created. Once 
the appropriate social or political pro-
cess determines the nature of privacy 
protections, it becomes the job of secu-
rity to implement those protections 
within those guidelines.
Thus, when asking this question, 
we should at least say “security and 
privacy” but really are better off not 
framing the question this way at all. 
We would be better served discuss-
ing surveillance versus privacy and 
leaving the questions of security as 
separate objective exercises in imple-
menting whatever choices are made. 
DUMINDA WIJESEKERA: Yes, privacy 
and many forms of it are an integral 
and the greater part of security. I think 
the correct question to discuss is down 
in the weeds. That is, if one formal-
izes it, or finds a formal language to 
precisely specify every form of cyber-
security (even if one thinks of secu-
rity and privacy as distinct entities) 
with respect to the same framework, 
then one could investigate which 
requirements contradict each other 
and which requirements can coexist. 
That is, there is one model of the two 
requirements that holds true in a sin-
gle model.
COMPUTER: Are cybersecurity pol-
icy and controls the right tools for 
enforcing data-privacy laws, policy, 
terms, and conditions? If so, how do 
you map security policy and controls 
to data privacy? How do you ensure 
the mapping is maintained for transi-
tive trust?
BISHOP: Whether the cybersecurity 
controls are the right tools to enforce 
the data-privacy laws, policies, terms, 
and conditions depends on the over-
lap between security and privacy. 
Some aspects of the data-privacy pol-
icy (which includes the relevant laws, 
terms, and conditions) will overlap the 
security policy. Others won’t. When 
there is overlap, the cybersecurity 
controls are appropriate for enforcing 
those parts of the data-privacy policy 
that do overlap.
Maintaining the mapping for tran-
sitive trust depends on your controls. 
Under some rare circumstances, you 
may be able to use cybersecurity tech-
nologies to enforce the mapping. But 
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for any realistic situation, you also need 
procedural controls, such as rights, laws, 
and the ability to enforce those. These 
will not enforce the mapping com-
pletely as one can ignore the legal and 
cultural norms, but to those who wish 
to cooperate, they can be very effective.
DENNING:  Privacy policy  specifies 
what data can be collected, who is 
allowed to access that information, 
and how the data can be used. Security 
policy and controls support privacy 
policy by protecting data from unau-
thorized access and ensuring that the 
data are adequately protected when 
stored or transmitted. But they can-
not prevent a person who has autho-
rized access from misusing data once 
acquired. Thus, some aspects of pri-
vacy policy are outside the scope of 
security and depend on good will, 
criminal prosecution, and civil law-
suits for enforcement.
GARFINKEL:  Daniel Solove’s “Tax-
onomy of Privacy”3 is a useful tool for 
answering this question. Solove’s work 
identifies four primary categories of pri-
vacy harms: collection (surveillance and 
interrogation), information processing 
(aggregation, identification, insecurity, 
secondary use, and exclusion), informa-
tion dissemination (breach of confiden-
tiality, disclosure, exposure, increased 
accessibility, appropriation, and distor-
tion), and invasion (intrusion and deci-
sional interference). Using Solove’s tax-
onomy, it’s clear that security policy and 
controls are the right tools for prevent-
ing some privacy harms but not correct 
for others.
For example, security controls that 
provide for authentication, autho-
rization, and accounting (AAA) po-
tentially provide protection against 
insecurity and breach of confidenti-
ality since they allow an organiza-
tion to do a better job of protecting 
confidential information and iden-
tify people within the organization 
who do not honor its commitments. 
At the same time, strong AAA would 
do nothing to stop an organization 
that uses inappropriately obtained 
information to interfere with a per-
son’s decisions.
In 2018, Mary Theofanos and I pub-
lished a review article presenting “a 
curated list of 44 privacy historically 
noteworthy incidents in which indi-
viduals suffered privacy harms that 
were not the result of data breaches.”4 
Of these, 21 took place under the pur-
view of the organization, but 23 resulted 
from software bugs, the action of an 
individual or a few people, or a small 
group acting within the organization. 
Better accounting combined with 
internal audits within an organiza-
tion could have stopped many of the 
privacy incidents in the second cat-
egory, while external audits would 
have been needed to prevent or min-
imize the 21 privacy incidents in the 
first category.
STALLINGS: The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
been a leader in this area. In January 
2020, NIST issued its Privacy Frame-
work, which is a companion to the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and 
this framework provides guidance on 
using security and privacy controls for 
privacy risk management. It is a man-
agement-oriented policy and planning 
tool. To back that up are NIST special 
publications SP 800-53 and SP 53 A, 
which list a huge number of controls, 
with commentary and evaluation 
guidance plus an indication of which 
ones support security, privacy, and 
or both. So these are tremendously 
important tools for security and pri-
vacy managers.
T H AW:  Blu n t l y,  ye s.  Muc h of  my 
answer stems from the reasoning 
behind my discussion of the first ques-
tion regarding the framing of secu-
rity versus privacy—that is the wrong 
framing. Security is a tool that imple-
ments goals privacy lays out.
WIJESEKERA: I think that this ques-
tion presupposes that the terms secu-
rit y policies and controls refer to 
access control or flow control policies. 
If one expands the definition of “con-
trols,” then privacy controls would be 
within the context of the same frame-
work that can expect to answer the 
question in more specific contexts 
as referred to in my answer to the 
first question.
COMPUTER: What currently prevents 
society from preventing or effectively 
pushing back against f lagrant dis-
regard of data privacy by companies 
that collect or infer information about 
individuals?
BISHOP: I think a lack of will, re -
sources, political clout, or some com-
bination of these. Lawsuits are expen-
sive, time-consuming, and draining to 
the victims, and indeed, they may not 
even be possible (for example, what is 
a “flagrant disregard of data privacy” 
in one country is perfect ly acceptable 
in another). Legal or political action 
requires that the lawmakers or politi-
cians want to and are able to help. This 
usually involves some sort of organized 
campaign to bring the problems to 
their attention and make clear the need 
to (and benefits of) dealing with the 
problems. Remember President Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt’s famous dictum: 
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“Okay, you’ve convinced me. Now bring 
pressure on me!”
DENNING: It is impossible to pre-
vent any company from scouring the 
Internet for images or other types 
of data that are publicly accessible 
and then using those data to create a 
product or service, such as facial rec-
ognition software. However, if the 
company disregards privacy, there 
will be pushback, including bad pub-
licity and lawsuits. For such push-
back to be effective, we need strong 
privacy laws about data collection 
and use so that there is a legal basis 
for the lawsuits and criminal prose-
cution for violations.
STALLINGS: Sad to say, I think that is 
a lost battle. There used to be a clear 
consensus against mass surveillance 
and other privacy-invasive practices. 
In the United States, there was a will-
ingness to take a big step back from 
that for many people after the terror-
ist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001. Many seemed to believe the 
tradeoff a valid one. The government 
could monitor email and phone traf-
fic in exchange for keeping us safe. 
Similar thinking occurred in other 
countries. But the pandemic spread 
of COVID-19 has dramatically eroded 
what resistance remained. We see a lot 
of demonstrations, but by and large, 
my sense is that people will accept all 
that goes along with contact tracing in 
exchange for safety from the virus. I 
doubt we will go back from that after 
the virus is brought under control.
THAW: I think the answer is that the 
question is wrong. It assumes that 
society is not pushing back. At best, 
we don’t yet know whether, and if so 
how effectively, society has been able 
to “push back” against certain types of 
surveillance. The results of such push-
back would not be truly determin-
able by the markets for months (if not 
years), and legislative policy responses 
can take even longer.
Instead, I would suggest that we 
need to analyze both market and polit-
ical responses to a range of surveil-
lance capitalism technologies over 
time and use those analyses to deter-
mine whether effective economic or 
political mechanisms exist to repre-
sent the interests of all members of 
society. In short—the jury’s still out.
WIJESEKERA: I need to know more 
about the details prior to commenting 
on this question. This issue relies not 
only on the technical capabilities but 
also on what has been legislated as pri-
vacy laws, crimes, and so forth as well 
as how courts have interpreted them, 
such as narrow majorities in appellate 
courts carving out a special interpre-
tation of the laws to suit their political 
paybacks. Both bringing the flagrant 
violations to notice and taking actions 
require a substantial effort that is not 
always there as long as one segment of 
the community profits sufficiently to 
prevent them from feeling violated; 
that is, there is a financial disincen-
tive to advocate for laws, preventive 
mechanisms, and enforcement. Con-
versely, some of the legislative defi-
nitions that articulate the constraints 
preventing privacy violations may 
not be 100% in sync with the techni-
cal capabilities that can be expected 
of products and the willingness to 
enforce the breaches.
COMPUTER:  What does it mean to 
strike a balance between security 
and privacy concerns, given that 
users clamor for anonymity and the 
protection of their PII but then exhibit 
risky online behavior by using digital 
services that are well known or sus-
pected to be collecting information 
about users and that do not have good 
track records of protecting the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability 
of PII?
BISHOP: I’m not sure you can bal-
ance privacy and security when users 
behave in ways that endanger privacy 
or security. First, ideas of what infor-
mation about people is “private” differs 
among individuals, so what one per-
son might deem “risky,” another might 
think is perfectly safe. Second, and 
more importantly, people might not 
realize what online behavior creates a 
risk to their privacy. Most websites will 
state what information they collect and 
how it will be used, but this is rarely 
a simple and straightforward exposi-
tion. The statements usually read like 
the “terms of use” for programs, so they 
can be very long and are couched in 
legalese, which is hard for most people 
to understand. Also, to whom are the 
sites collecting such information “well 
known or suspected” and have a poor 
track record? Those of us in cybersecu-
rity can usually find this information, 
but the average noncybersecurity user 
probably can’t.
DENNING: What is there to balance? 
I’m concerned about both. Perhaps 
many users are uninformed or ambiv-
alent about both security and privacy. 
They might deem their behavior con-
sistent with the perceived risks.
GARFINKEL: There has been more than 
two decades of research on this topic, 
which is broadly called “the privacy par-
adox.” Some research has shown that 
users exhibiting risky online behavior 
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are sometimes not aware of the risk, but 
at other times, they simply assess the 
risks and benefits differently than pri-
vacy “experts.” Other research has found 
that many users engage in risky behav-
ior either because they believe that 
they are in fact adequately protected or 
because they believe that their data are 
already compromised and have nothing 
more to lose. We also know many users 
attempt to protect themselves through 
compartmentalization or by providing 
inaccurate or incomplete information, 
but these defenses are significantly 
harder to quantify. (This would be like 
giving respondents a survey asking how 
often they lie on surveys.)
STALLINGS: I don’t think this is an 
issue of a balance between security 
and privacy. This is a pure privacy risk 
issue. The majority of people don’t focus 
on this issue, and, frankly, I don’t think 
they are that much interested in it. 
Curbing unnecessary privacy risks and 
violations falls to activists, groups like 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
government lawmakers and regulators.
THAW: I also disagree with the fram-
ing of this question. What we’re really 
talking about here is striking a balance 
between surveillance concerns and 
privacy concerns. And there’s decades 
of good literature discussing why this 
is hard for consumers. Much of it cen-
ters on whether users actually have an 
effective market-participant “choice.” 
If all your friends and family are on 
a given social network, do you really 
have a meaningful choice not to use 
that network? If all the local media in 
your region (and all the national media 
in your nation) use various surveil-
lance technologies for their websites, 
apps, and so forth, do you really have 
a meaningful choice? These questions 
can richly be debated, but these are the 
types of questions we should be asking 
about the balance between surveil-
lance and privacy.
WIJESEKERA: You cannot have it 
both ways. The second issue is that 
the definition of PII expands with 
technical advances, but the legis-
lated def i n it ion cha nges slowly. 
Thus, one may take advantages of 
this varying gap.
COMPUTER: Many people around 
the globe have been the victims of 
data breaches. At what point does pri-
vacy, or for that matter security, mat-
ter to them since their PII is already 
circulating in the wild?
BISHOP: Data breaches do not result 
in the compromise of the same type of 
information for all breaches. One may 
reveal my financial state; another, a 
medical condition; and a third, infor-
mation that does not compromise my 
privacy until it is combined with data 
from a fourth breach. So protecting 
privacy, even after a data breach, is 
important; the same is true of secu-
rity. After all, if an attacker breaks 
into a company’s computer system and 
reads confidential data, the company 
does not (or should not) say, “well, it’s 
out there, so we don’t need to protect 
anything anymore.” By analogy, the 
same goes for privacy breaches.
DENNING: Even if the data held by one 
of your service providers are exposed 
in a data breach against that provider, 
there is likely considerably more infor-
mation about you held by other provid-
ers. The security of that data will still 
matter to you.
In addition, many of the PII data 
that are exposed in a breach become 
obsolete. For example, stolen credit 
card data have short lifetimes since 
card owners get new numbers when 
the breach is discovered. Similarly, 
a stolen password is useless once the 
owner knows about the breach and 
changes it. I don’t know of anyone who 
gives up on security or privacy after 
these breaches. More likely responses 
include using stronger passwords, 
adopting two-factor authentication, 
and freezing credit accounts.
GARFINKEL: The obligation of a data 
custodian to ensure that the security 
and privacy of data continues even if 
the data subjects have been the victim 
of data breaches. This makes sense 
from a practical point of view because 
there may be new potential attack-
ers who do not have access to the data 
that have been compromised. It makes 
sense from a legal point of view: an 
organization’s legal obligation to pro-
tect data doesn’t stop if other organi-
zations have been careless. Finally, 
there is a moral requirement, stem-
ming from the fact that privacy is a 
human right, as established by Article 
12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.5
STALLINGS: It has reached a point, I 
think, where the members of the pub-
lic tunes all the talk about privacy out 
unless they have a specific experience, 
such as a credit card theft. There are 
so many data being collected, many 
of them PII related, that the average 
person just can’t wrap his or her arms 
around the privacy issue. And I think 
5G takes us beyond the ability to hope 
to have firm control of privacy prac-
tices. With 5G, data can be transmitted 
from billions of Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices to and through mobile carriers 
to a variety of consumers. The data are 
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much more specific and in greater vol-
ume by orders of magnitude from what 
has gone before. Regulations, such as 
the European Union’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), 
may help somewhat in requiring orga-
nizations to be transparent with how 
the data will be stored, processed, and 
disseminated and how they can obtain 
consent related to individuals’ PII, but I 
think the implications of 5G and IoT are 
too broad for regulations to keep pace.
THAW: PII is a potential red herring. 
So-called PII is only a security threat 
vector if other parties require its 
use for authentication purposes, as 
opposed to identification purposes. 
This is a distinction I’m concerned 
has received far too little attention 
the past two decades. We should care 
greatly, for example, if ATM PIN codes 
are compromised in a breach. That is a 
security risk. But we should not have 
a system where the account num-
ber is similarly vulnerable—yet this 
is exactly what happens with credit 
cards (at least in the United States). 
Because, for many intents and pur-
poses, the credit card number is both 
the identification and the authentica-
tion credential, it is very difficult to 
create secure and usable systems. A 
similar problem exists for Social Secu-
rity numbers.
The real questions we need to be 
asking are about how we can rede-
sign systems to prohibit the dual 
usage of information as both identi-
fication and authentication creden-
tials. Your username never should 
be your password.
WIJESEKERA: It will not matter—it’s 
only a matter of how much time or 
effort one wants to spend on obtaining 
information about any individual.
COM PUTE R:  Nu merous sec u r it y 
vulnerabilities have been identified 
in electronic conferencing and chat 
applications, in some cases resulting 
in user data being misappropriated by 
unauthorized third parties. Can such 
vulnerabilities be dealt with effec-
tively, or should users just lower their 
expectations for data privacy, data 
security, or both?
BISHOP: Some vulnerabilities can be 
dealt with effectively; others can’t. If 
it’s a technical issue, then it can and 
should be dealt with quickly; for exam-
ple, if the session is enciphered using 
a weak cipher, that can and should 
be changed. But if it’s a nontechnical 
issue, then resolving it may be very 
difficult. To continue the example, in 
some countries, it might be illegal for 
information encrypted using a strong 
cipher to transit any part of the coun-
try without the key being registered 
with the government. The way to deal 
with this (figure out which countries 
to avoid? keep the weak cipher? auto-
matically register the key? remind the 
user to do so?) may not be clear, and 
once a solution is proposed, examin-
ing it for effectiveness and compliance 
is another problem.
Whether users need to lower their 
expectations depends on what those 
expectations are. Having the most 
secure conferencing and chat applica-
tions won’t help if an attacker has com-
promised one of the endpoints. A good 
rule of thumb is not to say or send any-
thing that you would not want made 
public. Like any rule of thumb, it has 
exceptions (you may have no choices; 
for example, you may need to have a 
remote medical consultation). 
DENNING:  In some cases, users can 
adopt practices that help protect against 
this, such as using end-to-end encryp-
tion and requiring passwords to enter 
a conference or confirmation from 
the host. And vendors usually fix vul-
nerabilities after they are discovered 
and reported. But it’s wise to assume 
that new vulnerabilities will always be 
found and take that into account when 
sharing information online.
GARFINKEL: Numerous security vul-
nerabilities have been identified in 
all kinds of software, including oper-
ating systems, word processors, the 
telephone system, smartphones, and 
so on. Security vulnerabilities must be 
addressed, and they won’t be tackled if 
users lower their requirements for pri-
vacy or security.
With specific reference to elec-
tronic conferencing and chat applica-
tions, many of these applications were 
developed without clearly articulated 
security models by organizations that 
may not have prioritized security and 
privacy. Fortunately, these systems 
can be improved. In the meantime, 
there is a free market, and organiza-
tions that prioritize security will pre-
sumably exercise their market power.
STALLINGS:  Of course, they can 
be dealt with effectively. There are 
explicit requirements in regulations 
like the GDPR and similar regulations 
in other countries. There are a number 
of documents that represent wide con-
sensus on best practices, including the 
NIST documents I mentioned earlier, 
the International Standards Organi-
zation’s ISO 29000 series of privacy 
standards, and the privacy aspects of 
ISACA’s Control Objectives for Infor-
mation Technologies and the Informa-
tion Security Forum’s Standard of Good 
Practice for Information Security 2018. 
Industry-specific guidance includes 
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the Payment Card Industry Data Secu-
rity Standard. And increasingly, cor-
porate privacy officers are well quali-
fied to manage the implementation of 
privacy controls. Even so, with all the 
costs involved in doing effective pri-
vacy by design, it will take public inter-
est and strong regulatory enforcement 
to maintain good privacy practices.
TH AW:  Blu nt ly,  yes. T h i s i s not a 
“hard” problem. Sure, there are some 
edge cases that are interesting, and 
assuredly, more such edge cases will 
develop as newer apps with differing 
designs are created. I expressly do not 
address the issue of government-au-
thorized surveillance here as that is 
a separate question that needs to be 
answered separately.
WIJESEKERA: Both, as the search for 
vulnerabilities and their discovery 
during reverse engineering, red-team-
ing, and forensics investigations con-
tinue, and should. The best efforts 
there would make it costly for attack-
ers, but the user community has to be 
aware of the exact nature of security 
guarantees—that they are limited in 
scope, apply only to one kind of vulner-
ability exploitation in one context, and 
do not provide a global, blanket cover-
age or liability of breach.
COMPUTER: Recent laws and regula-
tions, such as GDPR and the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), 
which went into effect 1 January 2020, 
were designed to enhance privacy pro-
tections. Are they having an effect on 
privacy and security practices? What 
about compliance issues, given the lack 
of global, and in some cases, domestic 
harmonization (for example, between 
states within the United States) of pri-
vacy laws and regulations?
BISHOP: I believe they are having an 
effect on privacy and security prac-
tices. Many non-European institutions 
that collaborate internationally, or 
have international branches, are mov-
ing to comply with the GDPR. The same 
is true for institutions falling under 
the CCPA. I have heard of some insti-
tutions (notably web servers) blocking 
European connections to avoid having 
to deal with GDPR. That’s an effect, 
although not a desirable one.
Compliance issues become very 
interesting when the rules for which 
compliance is required contradict one 
another. At that point, you need to 
get a lawyer involved so he or she can 
advise you.
DENNING: Laws and regulations are 
having a positive effect. As a Califor-
nia resident, I’ve seen more attention 
to privacy from service providers that 
hold confidential information.
A greater harmonization of privacy 
laws and regulations would also help. 
The California law and other state 
privacy laws would be good starting 
points for federal legislation.
GARFINKEL: For me, the main impact 
of GDPR is that I must now click to 
“accept cookies” for nearly every non-
U.S. government website that I visit. 
For the CCPA, the main impact for me 
has been that some sites and applica-
tions now prominently display the rec-
ommended language “Do Not Sell My 
Personal Information”—wording man-
dated by the California authorities.
As my comments imply, most com-
panies have taken these laws as com-
pliance exercises that they have been 
able to address with changes to their 
user interface—but not necessarily 
by improving their overall policies. 
For example, when I recently clicked 
on a “Do Not Sell My Personal Infor-
mation” link, the next page required 
that I provide my home address, and it 
wouldn’t allow me to submit the form 
because I don’t live in California. Not 
being a California resident, I could 
not request that the company not sell 
my personal information! While these 
laws will certainly enable a new gener-
ation of class-action lawsuits, it is too 
early to know if they will establish new 
data processing norms that need to 
be followed by ethical companies and 
organizations.
S TA L L I N G S :  P r i v a c y  o f f i c e r s  i n 
companies that do business in the 
European Union and California are 
responding to GDPR and CCPA, respec-
tively. We will see technical imple-
mentations and policy changes put in 
place over time. The magnitude of the 
actual effect on consumer privacy is 
yet to be seen.
THAW: Of course they are having an 
effect—the question is whether they 
are having the desired effect. In the 
case of the CCPA, it’s just too early to 
tell. GDPR has been around longer but 
really is not at its core a security reg-
ulation. It is much more about provid-
ing individuals with notice, transpar-
ency, and control (to varying degrees) 
of the use, retention, and maintenance 
of certain types of their information. 
Security measures (obviously) need 
to be i ncor porated to i mplement 
these goals, but these are primarily 
privacy goals.
Regarding cross-jurisdictional enfo-
rc ement and harmonization (or the lack 
thereof) among privacy laws—obvi-
ously, it would be “easier” if all the laws 
were the same. But that isn’t a very inter-
esting statement. The more import-
ant question at the core of this issue is 
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whether or not there is a social benefit in 
allowing nations, states, or even regions 
to provide different levels of privacy 
depending on the desires of their local 
polities. It is certainly the case that given 
the vast differences among the diverse 
cultures of the world, we should tread 
lightly in asking for “global” harmoniza-
tion. It also is likely the case that in any 
harmonized system, we should consider 
thoroughly whether we want to allow 
“smaller” units (a state within a nation, 
a city within a state, and so forth) to 
provide greater protections than those 
afforded by the “larger” unit.
WIJESEKERA:  At best, compliance 
comes much later—perhaps through 
engineering innovations and the con-
sequences of legal action after dam-
age. Although the Internet or global 
access to information though other 
forms of human contact are bound 
by law, these laws are not universally 
binding nor universally enforceable 
nor do they use international treaties.  
COMPUTER:  Many cell phone apps 
are designed to monitor the user’s loca-
tion at all times, not just when the app 
is in use, including many that have no 
reasonable use for location data. Users 
may not be aware of this type of mon-
itoring. Should laws or regulations 
have more limits on what kind of, and 
how much, user information compa-
nies should be allowed to collect.  
BISHOP: This really goes back to one of 
your earlier questions. The most widely 
adopted solution is to tell the user what 
data are being collected and how they 
will be used. Most users simply click 
“Accept” without reading the terms. 
Those that do read the terms often don’t 
understand them or their implications. 
Further, in many cases, companies can 
unilaterally change the terms. Usually, 
when they do this, they have to allow 
users to opt out of information shar-
ing—but that is “opt out,” not “opt in,” 
and the latter is always better.
DENNING: We might need more lim-
its, but we also need better transpar-
ency so that users know what they’re 
getting into when they sign up for or 
use some service. That information 
should be clearly communicated to 
users and not buried in the fine print 
of privacy policies.
GARFINKEL: The problem with laws 
and regulations is that they are nec-
essarily broad and not easily changed, 
so they always lag behind innovation. 
Many techniques that it might seem 
reasonable to ban today might be 
desired in the future if they are offered 
in a manner that is secure and respects 
user privacy and intentions.
At the same time, we have more 
than two decades of research showing 
convincingly that “informed consent” 
doesn’t work in most privacy-related 
situations. There are simply too many 
decisions requiring consent, and users 
rarely have the time, interest, and 
technical sophistication to be prop-
erly informed.
I think that one possible solution is 
to migrate away from business mod-
els based on harvesting and reselling 
personal information. The financial 
windfall of behavioral advertising 
never really materialized, and nobody 
likes having advertisements for mat-
tresses follow them around the Inter-
net for months after purchasing a new 
bed. Meanwhile, I believe that apps 
and services offered by governments, 
nonprofits, and community-based 
organizations will increase in popu-
larity in the coming years.
STALLINGS: I’m not sure a lot more 
is needed in terms of regulations. I 
think regulations should lean more 
toward requiring opt in instead of opt 
out. And I think the list of rights and 
principles in GDPR is a good model for 
other regulations to adopt.
WIJESEKERA: Yes, but the question is 
enforceability (both technically due to 
attacks) and accountability.
COMPUTER: The pandemic spread 
of COVID-19 has upended societies 
around the world, often in ways that 
conflict with privacy. For example, 
Apple and Google announced that 
they are each developing applica-
tion-programming interfaces but 
intend to integrate into their respec-
tive operating systems, for mobile 
devices they support, the capability 
to collect contact-tracing data. Will 
these intrusive capabilities become 
permanent features of mobile device 
operating systems, as they already 
have become in many mobile device 
apps? Even if users are permitted 
to opt in/opt out,  can the operating 
systems and apps be hardened suf-
ficiently to prevent unauthorized 
access to detailed user-identifiable, 
contact-tracing data by governments 
and others for purposes other than 
combatting a pandemic? Can cor-
porations be trusted not to dissemi-
nate contact-tracing data with gov-
ernments and other third parties 
beyond the originally stated scope 
of sharing?
BISHOP: I believe they will become 
permanent—it’s always easier to add 
something to a system than remove 
it. I also doubt if the operating sys-
tems and apps can be hardened suf-
f icient ly. If a government wants 
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that information, it has tremendous 
resources to get it; techniques used 
have included implanting spyware, 
for example. And as mobile devices are 
vulnerable to attack, the attacker may 
not be a government.
As far as trusting Apple and Goo-
gle, I can’t comment on the trustwor-
thiness of either. In general, a good 
way to determine this is to look at 
how those companies, or any compa-
nies, react to authoritative regimes’ 
dema nd s for access to t he d at a. 
Whether they comply, and if so how, 
will tell you a lot about how they value 
their users’ privacy.
Also, remember that, in many cases, 
the user is not the customer of the cor-
poration; third parties are. Often, it 
is advertisers, and the data collected 
about the user enable targeted adver-
tising. This needs to be factored into 
how trustworthy an entity (corpora-
tion, government, and so on) is.
DENNING: It isn’t enough to just trust 
that companies and the government 
will get it right. We need to make sure 
that the technology being developed 
and deployed is responsive to our secu-
rity and privacy concerns. This might 
require new policies and laws regarding 
contact tracing. Whether contact-trac-
ing apps become permanent will depend 
on how useful they turn out be.
GARFINKEL: The “intrusive capabil-
ities” described in the question are 
already permanent features of mobile 
device operating systems, and they 
are not opt in/opt out, they are widely 
available and deployed. For exam-
ple, in 2018, The New York Times doc-
umented how fine-grained geoloca-
tion data for many cell phone users 
are being collected and archived.6 
Today, there are multiple systems that 
capture time-based geolocation data 
on the typical cell phone, each cor-
responding to a different advertis-
ing network.
The question facing platforms and 
users is whether application-specific 
contact-tracing technology should 
be deployed and what should be done 
with those data. This is a public policy 
decision, not a technology question. 
To be effective, these systems should 
be mandatory, and the collected data 
should be integrated into existing pub-
lic health contact-tracing programs. 
That’s because technologies like Blue-
tooth may overestimate a person’s con-
tacts: Bluetooth might think that peo-
ple on opposite sides of a plastic barrier 
or a window are standing next to each 
other. Meanwhile, these systems are 
likely to be hacked by individuals 
and nefarious organizations in ways 
that are not apparent when they are 
being designed.
As for the question of whether 
specific companies can be trusted 
to act in a manner consistent with 
their public statements—the defini-
tion of a trusted system is one that 
can violate your security policy with-
out you having recourse. Of course, 
these companies can be trusted. We 
should ask: should these companies 
be trusted?
STALLINGS: Lots of questions! The 
a n s wer is “ be pessi m ist ic, be ver y 
pessimistic.”
THAW: I don’t think anyone “knows” 
whether or not contact-tracing apps 
will become “permanent” features. It 
is just as easy to write a law limiting 
such permanence as it is to write one 
that never expires. Legislatures will 
confront these questions, and they 
should think carefully and seriously 
on what mechanisms (for example, 
sunset clauses) they wish to put into 
their laws to limit the likelihood 
of continued use past the original 
justification. Furthermore, legisla-
tures should think carefully on the 
scope of use and whether to adopt 
language prohibiting the use of col-
lected information for any other pur-
pose. This is not unprecedented—in 
the United States, for example, sim-
ilar legal limitations exist on the use 
of U.S. census data and on data col-
lected in the course of background 
investigations.
WIJESEKERA: Yes, once the genie is 
out of the bottle, there is no putting 
it back in, and more applications of 
this kind will start to evolve and be 
enhanced. Trusting a company does 
not matter as much as the effects 
caused by legislative incoherence 
where different localities interpret the 
same application as providing healthy 
practices for the community (where, 
of course, the definition of the com-
munity varies due to time, cultural 
differences, and immediate needs) or 
as a privacy violation. 
COMPUTER :  Five years from now, 
will we still be asking the question: 
is it security and privacy, or security 
or privacy?
BISHOP: Yes.
DENNING: I didn’t know it was ever a 
question. My interest in security, start-
ing almost 50 years ago, was driven by 
a desire to design mechanisms that 
would protect private data from reach-
ing unauthorized persons.
GARFINKEL:  I honestly don’t think 
t hat ma ny people a re a sk i ng t h is 
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question now. For most readers of Com-
puter, I suspect there is wide belief that 
both security and privacy are achiev-
able goals. Meanwhile, I think a grow-
ing number of nontechnical people 
believe that both security and privacy 
are unattainable.
STALLINGS: On the level of technical 
implementation and system design, it 
will always be a question of how best to 
implement both security and privacy. 
All these other issues we’ve been dis-
cussing have to do with the demand 
for privacy on the part of PII princi-
pals, the level of enforcement of reg-
ulations, the amount of risk imposed 
on organizations for violating privacy, 
and so forth. But as to the actual ques-
tion, security and privacy are both 
important, by and large compatible, 
and doable.
THAW: I hope not. After 20 years of 
listening to variations on “security 
versus privacy,” when the question is 
overwhelmingly really asking about 
“surveillance versus privacy,” I admit 
I’m skeptical that this debate will 
change. But I continue to hope.
WIJESEKERA: On the industry side, 
there will be contributions to priva-
cy-enhancing technologies and cyber-
security enforcement mechanisms. 
Both sides will keep the issue alive. On 
the academic side, as long as h-indices 
and other such tangential metrics gov-
ern academia and its offshoots, we will 
do our best to keep all corpses alive as 
they advance some peoples’ superiority 
over others. If and when these interests 
converge to a fixed point is difficult to 
envision, but I do not anticipate them 
converging within a decade. 
T he panelists in this virtual round-table provided us with a deeper understanding of the correspon-
dence between security and policy. It 
was interesting to see that the panelists 
had similar perspectives. We hope the 
outcome of this panel will help technol-
ogists better address the interrelation-
ship between security and privacy in 
the engineering of systems upon which 
society depends.
We welcome your feedback on Com-
puter’s virtual roundtables. Last but 
not least, we thank the participants of 
this virtual roundtable.
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